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GETTING IN AND OUT OF THE HOUSE:  THE 
WORLDS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL, BIG LAW, 
AND EMERGING CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF IN-
HOUSE LAWYERS 
Eli Wald* 
INTRODUCTION 
The traditional story of in-house counsel is of a transformation and triumph 
over “Big Law” in a zero-sum game for power, prestige, and money.1  That 
story, however, is inaccurate descriptively, prescriptively, and normatively.  
Descriptively, in-house lawyers were part of the legal elite dominating 
corporate counseling before large law firms first rose to power and 
prominence.  In-house counsel then lost ground and the position of general 
counsel to Big Law lawyers between the 1940s and 1970s, only to mount an 
impressive comeback to elite status beginning in the 1970s.  Yet the in-house 
comeback was not a simple power struggle with Big Law.  Rather, modern 
in-house lawyers including the “new” general counsel came from within the 
ranks of Big Law, an offshoot rather than a competitor of large law firms, 
sharing Big Law’s background, training, and, more importantly, professional 
values, ideology, and ethos.  Thus, the story of in-house lawyers and their 
relationship with Big Law is one of a complex symbiotic affiliation, not a 
competitive zero-sum game. 
Discrediting the standard zero-sum game account and accurately 
describing the in-house counsel–Big Law relationship as a symbiotic 
codependency is not merely a matter of correcting the historical record.  
Rather, the standard story is incapable of answering basic questions about 
corporate law practice.  For example, if in-house counsel triumphed over Big 
Law in a zero-sum game, why have in-house lawyers gained only limited 
control over outside counsel and core legal functions of the corporation?  
Why are some large law firms prospering when they should be declining?  
Moreover, if in-house counsel won, why are some in-house lawyers moving 
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 1. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749. 
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back to Big Law?  In contrast, the symbiotic understanding of the Big Law–
in-house relationship reveals answers to all of these questions:  rhetoric aside, 
in-house lawyers never sought to strip outside counsel of their power and 
control and, given their dependence on Big Law, in-house lawyers were 
never in a position to accomplish such a goal.  Instead, the symbiotic 
codependency between in-house and Big Law lawyers explains both the 
continued success of some large law firms and the emergence of a two-way 
street between in-house departments and Big Law. 
In turn, the revised account raises normative questions about the roles and 
ideologies of in-house and Big Law lawyers and, indeed, of the entire legal 
profession.  Critics have long lamented the inability and unwillingness of 
corporate lawyers to act as gatekeepers and dissuade their entity clients from 
wrongdoing.  The symbiotic relationship between in-house and outside 
counsel both questions the self-proclaimed ability of in-house lawyers to act 
as the conscience of their entity clients and further undercuts the role of 
outside counsel as lawyer-statespersons.  On the other hand, the welcoming 
of in-house lawyers into the mainstream of corporate law practice may 
enhance their professional standing and identity and empower them to act as 
gatekeepers. 
This Article is organized in three parts.  Part I examines the rise, fall, and 
comeback of in-house lawyers over the past century.  In revising and 
correcting the standard story of in-house practice, Part I makes two 
contributions to the existing literature:  (1) disproving the zero-sum thesis, it 
explores the complex symbiotic relationship between in-house and Big Law, 
shedding new light on corporate law practice; and (2) it offers, for the first 
time, an account of in-house practice in the twenty-first century.  Part II 
explains how the symbiotic relationship resulted in in-house counsel 
achieving only partial control over the provision of corporate legal services, 
allowing some large law firms to continue to thrive, and explores how the 
codependency led to the emergence of a two-way Big Law–in-house street 
and the rise of a robust in-house lateral market.  These phenomena reflect the 
increased integration of the elite in-house and Big Law worlds, at the same 
time as the in-house universe itself expands and increasingly stratifies.  
Finally, Part III offers preliminary thoughts about the meaning and impact of 
the practice developments described in Parts I and II for in-house counsel, 
Big Law lawyers, the legal profession, and the public. 
I.  THE RISE, FALL, AND COMEBACK OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS 
“[One] of the most significant changes in corporate legal practice in the 
United States,”2 has been the rise to prominence of in-house lawyers over the 
last fifty years.  Once upon a time “castigated,”3 belittled as “house 
 
 2. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization:  The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057 (1997). 
 3. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and 
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 (1989). 
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counsel,”4 and perceived to be lawyers “who had not quite made the grade as 
partner[s],”5 some general counsel now “sit[] close to the top of the corporate 
hierarchy as member[s] of senior management,”6 having gained power, 
prestige, and respect.7  Yet, this remarkable transformation was not the first 
time in-house lawyers were part of the legal profession’s corporate elite.  
Rather, “[f]or a generation after the Civil War to be general counsel of a 
railroad was to hold the most widely esteemed sign of professional success.”8  
Indeed, the second and third decades of the twentieth century were “the 
golden years of corporate counsel—a time when their professional and 
business service was considered critical and repeatedly sought by 
management,”9 before in-house lawyers experienced a long decline from the 
1940s through the mid-1970s.10  Thus, the story of in-house lawyers over the 
past century is one of a swinging pendulum:  up, down, and back on top 
again. 
Telling the story of in-house lawyers accurately, from the evolution of 
their roles and practice over time to their background, identity of their entity 
clients, and career trajectories, matters descriptively, prescriptively, and 
normatively.  Descriptively, getting the story right reveals important insights 
about the practice of law, the evolution of legal elites, their relationships, and 
the development of career trajectories and roles over time.11  Prescriptively, 
an accurate understanding of the rise, fall, and resurgence of in-house counsel 
explains contemporary practice realities and provides clues about the future.  
Normatively, the rise, fall, and comeback of in-house lawyers shed light on 
the desirable, as well as the not so attractive, roles and ideologies of the legal 
profession. 
A.  The First-Generation In-House Lawyers of the Gilded Age:  Post–Civil 
War to the 1930s 
As “both business and legal advisers,” first-generation in-house counsel 
“were held in high repute and their sage counsel was regularly sought” by 
 
 4. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1011, 1011 (1997). 
 5. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985).  Although, as Carl Liggio astutely points out, Big Law was 
hard at work perpetuating this perception. Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate 
Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203 (1997). 
 6. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 277. 
 7. Rosen, supra note 3, at 479; see also Hazard, supra note 4, at 1011; Omari Scott 
Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers:  A Unifying Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 79–80 (2011). 
 8. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:  THE LAW MAKERS 297 
(1950). 
 9. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1201–02 (documenting the high compensation of corporate 
counsel and the legal background of many chief executive officers). 
 10. Id. at 1202–03. 
 11. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
955, 958 (2005). 
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members of senior management.12  Evidencing their elevated status of power 
and influence,13 general counsel were paid approximately 65 percent of the 
chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and usually were among a 
corporation’s three most highly compensated individuals.14 
These general counsel were part and parcel of the Gilded Age’s emerging 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) elite, established lawyers of the era 
who read law.15  In terms of their career trajectories, they were drawn from 
within the ranks of federal and state court judges16 and were being groomed 
to become CEOs: 
It was common at this time for companies to groom a member of their legal 
department to become CEO.  Indeed, more than 75% of corporate CEOs in 
America had a legal background during this period, as businesses 
recognized the added value a legal education (and the analytical tools 
associated with that education) offered to their business concerns.17 
Like the robber barons they served, these general counsel were 
entrepreneurs:  “[g]eneral counsel often assumed critical roles in arranging 
solutions to the financing challenges that confronted businesses in need of 
investment capital in an era when capital markets were less developed in 
depth and size.”18  According to James Willard Hurst, corporate finance and 
mergers and acquisitions work for railroads were key to “a whole new field 
of corporate counseling.”19  In-house lawyers became “familiar figure[s] on 
boards of directors; first the railroad general counsel, and then the lawyer for 
the investment banker led the way.”20 
The new fields of corporate counseling, governance, finance, and mergers 
and acquisitions, in turn, fueled the birth and gradual growth of the modern 
large corporate law firms, featuring the “Cravath System.”21  Importantly, 
these large law firms,22 like the general counsel themselves, were also 
 
 12. Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel:  Back to the Future—
or Is It the Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 621 (2002). 
 13. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (3d ed. 2005). 
 14. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1202. 
 15. HURST, supra note 8, at 297–98. 
 16. “In the post–Civil War period, judges were lured from federal and state courts by the 
attractions of serving as general counsel to railroads.” DeMott, supra note 11, at 958–59. 
 17. Constance E. Bagley et al., Who Let the Lawyers Out?:  Reconstructing the Role of 
the Chief Legal Officer and the Corporate Client in a Globalizing World, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
419, 432–33 (2016) (footnote omitted). 
 18. DeMott, supra note 11, at 958. 
 19. HURST, supra note 8, at 298. 
 20. Id. at 342. 
 21. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 9–10 (1991); WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890–1930, at 196–99 (1986); 1 
ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS:  1819–1947, at 1–3 (1946). 
 22. “Large” has a dynamic meaning in a historical context.  “[N]o firms of large 
membership appeared, even in the great cities, until the end of the [nineteenth] century.  The 
typical partnership was a two-man affair . . . .” HURST, supra note 8, at 306.  Through the 
1920s, a firm of four attorneys was considered a “large” firm. HOBSON, supra note 21, at 161.  
The benchmark for “large” reached fifty attorneys by the 1950s. See Erwin O. Smigel, The 
Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 56, 58 
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innovators, simultaneous newcomers to the legal profession.23  Rather than 
competitors, the emerging corporate law firms were initially contemporaries 
of general counsel, cut from the same WASP cloth24 and serving the same 
new legal needs for fast-growing entity clients.25  The coexistence was aided 
by the relatively small number of large law firms,26 which benefitted from 
stable client relationships,27 featured lawyers with similar ethnoreligious, 
class, and cultural identities as compared to those of the dominant in-house 
elite,28 as well as their different professional backgrounds and aspirations.  
Whereas general counsel were established judges being groomed for 
promotion to CEO, the founders of the new law firms were younger, 
ambitious lawyers seeking to advance and claim elite status.29  Yet the seeds 
of rivalry and competition between in-house counsel and outside counsel 
were sowed; whereas general counsel were part of the legal profession’s old-
school elite, founders of the new law firms were out to establish themselves 
as the new professional elite.30 
B.  Second-Generation “House Lawyers,” 1940s–1970s 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the development of new business 
and management bodies of knowledge and expertise led to the increased 
professionalization of corporate management.31  The professionalization of 
corporate management gradually led to the demise of the earlier generation 
of in-house counsel who were esteemed counsel to management.  The old 
model of the wise general counsel, steeped in practical wisdom but ignorant 
of new business-related bodies of knowledge, no longer fit the emerging 
management style, and they were relegated to secondary advisors on narrow, 
routine legal questions.32 
 
(1960).  By the late 1960s, “large” meant one hundred lawyers. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE 
WALL STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 358–59 (1964).  By the late 
1980s, “a firm of 50 members probably would not be considered large” in major cities. See 
Justin A. Stanley, Should Lawyers Stick to Their Last?, 64 IND. L.J. 473, 473 (1989).  Notably, 
in 1988, Baker & McKenzie became the first law firm with over one thousand attorneys. See 
generally Nancy Blodgett, Law Firm Tops 1,000 Barrier:  Chicago’s Baker & McKenzie, 
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 30; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament:  
A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1873 n.23 (2008) 
(discussing the dynamic meaning of “large” firms). 
 23. Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1803, 1806–10 (2008); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 484. 
 24. Wald, supra note 23, at 1806–10. 
 25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 486. 
 26. Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2446 (2010). 
 27. Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge and the Context of 
Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 922 (2002). 
 28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 487. 
 29. Id. 
 30. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 24 (1976); Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–28. 
 31. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475–76 (1989). 
 32. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1202. 
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This new professionalized corporate management found a willing ally in 
the new elite of the legal profession, the large law firms.33  During the Gilded 
Age, while general counsel reigned supreme, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell and the formalists advocated for and established legal education as 
a science34 and built an alliance with the new growing large law firms.35  
Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and later other law schools established themselves 
as the elite of legal education.  At the same time, Paul Cravath and other 
innovators introduced the Cravath System and, with it, the concept of 
associates, who were hired directly out of these elite law schools.36  These 
two institutions—the large law firm and the law school—helped establish 
each other’s elite status.  Law, recognized as a formal science, taught as a 
professional applied science at law schools, and practiced as such at the 
emerging corporate law firms37 was exactly the kind of service 
professionalized management needed.  Thus, the professionalization of 
corporate management strengthened the position of outside elite large law 
firms as one-stop shops specialized in corporate legal advice.38  The new 
corporate law firms, aligned with elite law schools, established themselves 
as the legal elites by the 1930s and replaced first-generation in-house lawyers 
as general counsel.  Over time, as the legal needs of entity clients expanded, 
large law firms effectively bundled specialized services with general, more 
routine corporate legal services.  This expansion of legal services served the 
interests of both parties:  the large law firms used the influx of work to 
support their tournament of lawyers’ partner-to-associate ratios, to provide 
their associates with work, and to grow.  The entity clients used their 
affiliation with the by then recognized elite of the legal profession—Big 
Law—to legitimize and establish the elite credentials of their newly 
professionalized management.39 
The formalists’ establishment of law as a science emphasized independent 
exercise of professional judgment as a constitutive ingredient of legal 
practice.40  Law was independent of other bodies of knowledge, a self-
 
 33. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 21, at 20–36. 
 34. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW:  JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 43–92 (2014); Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 295 (2018). 
 35. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S, at 51 (1983) (From the beginning of the twentieth century, “the elite law schools 
were seen as increasingly bent on serving corporate law firms . . . .  The elite law schools grew 
alongside the burgeoning corporate law firms.” (footnotes omitted)); see also AUERBACH, 
supra note 30, at 28–30 (describing the symbiotic relationship between elite law schools and 
elite corporate law firms, matching the so-called best law students with the “best” law firms). 
 36. Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–25. 
 37. WEST, supra note 34, at 70–82. 
 38. SWAINE, supra note 21, at 575 (Paul Drennan Cravath’s “first great object was so to 
organize his firm and its staff as to make it competent to do, as nearly perfectly as it could be 
done, any acceptable work which might be offered. . . .  Prior to the time when Cravath took 
control as the active head of the firm, there had been little attempt at scientific organization in 
the office.” (quoting Cravath partner Carl August de Gersdorff)). 
 39. Wald, supra note 23, at 1810–25. 
 40. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1988). 
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contained professional zone, which “required” self-regulation and monopoly 
over the provision of legal services.41  Large law firms aggressively pushed 
this agenda, promoting their independence and independent exercise of 
professional judgment by their partners as a cornerstone of legal 
professionalism.42  This was the final death blow to the old, first-generation 
in-house lawyers:  not only were they not a product of the new, superior, 
professionalized education offered by elite law schools but, as in-house 
lawyers, they lacked the now respected and required independence of 
judgment.43 
In-house lawyers lost out.  By the 1930s, graduates of leading colleges 
flocked to elite law schools and the graduates of elite law schools flocked to 
the Wall Street law firms.44  These elite outside-counsel law firms became 
the new general counsel of corporate America.  Ironically, the new elite law 
firms were about to have a taste of their own medicine:  just as the first-
generation, golden era of in-house practice contained the seeds of its own 
demise, so too did the golden era of Big Law contain the seeds of its relative 
loss of power.  At the same time that large law firms were growing, forces in 
both corporate America and legal education were brewing to launch the 
comeback of in-house counsel. 
C.  The New Breed:  Third-Generation In-House Counsel, 1970s–2000s 
As the growth and professionalization of business continued and 
bureaucratized managerial hierarchies became the norm, the trend began to 
hurt Big Law.  Following legal realism and its offshoots, law was debunked 
as an independent, closed system of science.45  Large law firms’ brand of 
legal corporate advice had become outdated, replaced with “formal 
procedures with prescribed contributions from a variety of experts—
financial, economic, public affairs, and legal—all of whom are located and 
staffed from inside the corporation.”46  The growth and bureaucratization of 
corporate America opened the door for the reemergence of in-house lawyers, 
embedded in the organizational structures and procedures of entity clients, as 
powerful actors. 
At the same time, large and growing corporations had become the target 
of an increased, complex body of federal, state, and municipal-level 
regulation.  Responding to and complying with this increasing maze of 
regulatory activity,47 the rising salience of law as a feature of the corporate 
 
 41. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 
639 (1981). 
 42. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 22, at 1873. 
 43. Gordon, supra note 40, at 33. 
 44. AUERBACH, supra note 30, at 14–39. 
 45. WEST, supra note 34, at 28–35. 
 46. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 294. 
 47. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1203–04. 
1772 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
environment,48 and the routine use of business litigation as a corporate 
tactic,49 created a strong demand for legal services.  Initially catered to by 
rapidly growing large law firms at hefty premiums, over time, entity clients 
began to pressure law firms to reduce the escalating costs of legal services.50  
This provided fertile grounds for the emergence of in-house legal 
departments who argued that they could handle routine tasks at lower costs.51 
Corporate America’s growing legal needs increasingly demanded early, 
proactive attention as a matter of right, rather than as a reactive matter of 
attorney-client relationships.52  Just as corporations were trying to cap their 
outside counsel’s mounting costs, they discovered that Big Law inherently 
could not effectively and efficiently provide the full range of legal services 
they needed.  Even as large law firms were transitioning to offer 24/7, 
around-the-clock hypercompetitive services,53 they were, by definition, 
reactive and could not handle the masses of information one needed to 
possess and master to effectively address the legal needs of their clients, seas 
of associates and their billable hours notwithstanding.  This had to be done 
in-house.54  Moreover, Big Law’s traditional tournament structure, utilizing 
relatively expensive associates’ billable hours to address the routine needs of 
entity clients, proved excessively costly. 
Big Law’s historically successful campaign to depict in-house lawyers as 
second-class who “did not make partner with us” began to fail.55  On the one 
hand, the growth of large law firms, and their increasingly common 
hypercompetitive “eat what you kill” culture,56 made them less attractive to 
some partners who began to seriously consider offers from their large entity 
clients to go in-house.  Over time, in-house practice became Big Law’s 
greener pastures, capturing the professional aspirations of dissatisfied Big 
Law lawyers.57  On the other hand, the increased specialization of the 
practice of law meant that in-house practice was being perceived and touted 
by new in-house professional organizations, such as the American Corporate 
Counsel Association, as another corporate law specialty and no longer 
 
 48. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:  
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 
459 (2000). 
 49. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1203. 
 50. David Wilkins dubs this the “economic” claim of the in-house counsel movement. See 
David B. Wilkins, The In-House Counsel Movement, Metrics of Change, LEGAL BUS. WORLD 
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld.com/single-post/2017/01/20/The-In-House-
Counsel-Movement-Metrics-of-Change [https://perma.cc/ERK5-X5L8]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 281; Rosen, supra note 3, at 525. 
 53. Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends:  Professional Ideologies, Gender 
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2245, 2245 (2010). 
 54. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 281; Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice 
as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 281–82 (1990). 
 55. Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 426. 
 56. See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL OF A WALL 
STREET LAWYER (2004). 
 57. Wald, supra note 55, at 408. 
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frowned upon.58  Against these background conditions, it is hardly surprising 
that the in-house political movement, led by the very distinguished general 
counsel who made the move from Big Law, successfully resulted in the 
growing self-esteem and perceived status of in-house lawyers.59 
In a pioneering study, Robert Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen constructed 
a set of three categories mapping the range of roles, tasks, and lawyering 
styles of these third-generation general counsel.  First, there were “cops,” 
whose role was primarily a gatekeeping one, in which they relied on their 
legal expertise to give rule-based legal advice assessing legal risks.60  
Second, “counsel” who engaged in gatekeeping but relied on both legal and 
institutional knowledge to give legal and business advice.61  And third, 
“entrepreneurs” who understood their role to encompass a lot more than mere 
law avoidance and compliance and relied on legal, managerial, and economic 
knowledge to give law and business advice.62  Importantly, Nelson and 
Nielsen observed that “inside counsel play different roles in different 
circumstances,”63 yet conceded that the categories were more of ideal types 
than overlapping roles.64 
These ideal types mapped onto the identity of the new in-house and general 
counsel.  As well-respected graduates of elite law schools and elite large law 
firms (that is, as former senior partners), the new general counsel were well 
versed, trained, mentored, and suited to serve as cops at their new corporate 
homes.65  The long-standing relationships they and their law firms had with 
their entity clients in the 1970s through the 1980s and 1990s provided them 
with deep institutional knowledge that lent itself to the counsel role.66  
Finally, as the elite, self-proclaimed lawyer-statespersons of the era, some 
felt empowered to act as entrepreneurs.67 
Thus, in-house lawyers made a gradual comeback to power and elite status 
beginning in the 1970s and through the late 1990s, reclaiming the general 
counsel title and role from outside counsel.  Notably, however, some of the 
similarities to the first-generation in-house elite were superficial.  While in-
house lawyers were once again the elite general counsel, many features of 
their identity and practice were different than those of their first-generation 
predecessors:  the “new” elite general counsel came from within the ranks of 
Big Law, sharing the professional values and vision of client-centered 
 
 58. Hazard, supra note 4, at 1012. 
 59. David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global?:  A Preliminary 
Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economics, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 251, 
251–52. 
 60. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 462–70. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 463. 
 64. Id. at 462–63. 
 65. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?:  Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2076–85 (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 271 (1993). 
1774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
service.68  Unlike the previous clash between first-generation in-house 
counsel and large law firms, in which the rival lawyers had different 
credentials, status, and professional aspirations, and in which the success of 
the latter came at the direct expense of the former, third-generation in-house 
lawyers grew up in and were socialized into the legal profession in Big Law.  
While the new in-house lawyers deployed aggressive rhetoric, promising 
entity clients that they would curtail the high costs of large law firms and 
deliver superior legal services,69 the realities on the ground differed greatly. 
While some new general counsel tried to build large, more efficient, in-
house legal departments modeled after Big Law,70 for the majority of in-
house lawyers, the mission was to effectively manage and supervise the work 
of their old firms.71  Notably, most in-house lawyers did not set out to replace 
Big Law; they wanted and needed to work with large law firms to address 
their clients’ needs.  The large entity clients of the mid- and late twentieth 
century were radically different from their predecessors in the nineteenth 
century.  They were huge, global, professionalized, institutionalized, and 
bureaucratized compared to their century-old predecessors and required both 
in-house and outside counsel assistance.72  Moreover, and as importantly, the 
new in-house lawyers spent as much time establishing themselves and their 
contributions internally vis-à-vis skeptical corporate constituents as they did 
combating outside counsel.73 
Indeed, it is important not to portray the in-house comeback as an easy 
undertaking or to mischaracterize the challenges faced by in-house lawyers 
as primarily concerned with their love-hate symbiotic relationship with 
outside counsel.  For many third-generation in-house lawyers in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the primary challenge was on the home front, being accepted and 
trusted internally within the entity client by nonlawyer management and 
employees.74  In-house lawyers were often viewed as outsiders who did not 
understand or care about the business aspects of the client, naysayers who 
were cost centers standing in the way of business objectives, productivity, 
and efficiency.75  In this sense, describing aspects of the role of in-house 
lawyers as cops assumed a meaning different than helping clients ensure 
regulatory compliance and lawful conduct.  Being thought of as cops 
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reflected the mistrust and ambivalence of some corporate constituents toward 
their new in-house counsel.76  Thus, third-generation in-house lawyers 
prioritized establishing trust and their place at the corporate decision-making 
table and being recognized as valuable team players.77 
Still, in-house lawyers returned to power, leading some commentators to 
observe that “outside law firms largely have lost the function of general 
counsel and instead focus increasingly on the provision of specialized 
services on a case-by-case, transaction-by-transaction basis.”78  Other 
commentators even mistakenly predicted the death of Big Law.79  This 
mistake was twofold:  misunderstanding the new in-house elite and 
misreading the realities in Big Law.  The new in-house elite was all bred at 
large law firms, sharing Big Law lawyers’ educational background, culture, 
professional ethos, and ideology.80  Thus, while the new general counsel 
certainly were tasked and incentivized to cut the escalating bills of Big 
Law,81 the third generation of in-house lawyers had no reason, no interest, 
and little ability to bring Big Law down.  That is, unlike the 1930s, in which 
Big Law lawyers intentionally targeted second-generation in-house lawyers 
as outdated, dependent, “did not make partner” failures,82 the comeback 
third-generation in-house elite had no inherent animosity toward Big Law. 
Relatedly, it is imperative to remember the context of immense growth in 
size and profits of Big Law through the 1990s, at the same time as in-house 
lawyers completed their comeback.  While the elite of Big Law remained 
relatively stable,83 new large law firms emerged, others were growing fast, 
and all were raising rates annually up to an unsustainable 10 percent,84 in the 
context of a changing culture featuring a more explicit emphasis on the 
financial bottom line.  Profits-per-partner were on the constant rise and Big 
Law mobility peaked.85  Against this background, the entity-client push to 
curb costs ought to be understood as cutting not lean and mean legal fees but 
out of control, escalating legal bills.  The stage was set not for the death of 
Big Law but rather for a market correction and the end of the “good times” 
of the 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
 76. See, e.g., TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015) (exploring the role 
of cops in the context of the mistrust and ambivalence of racial communities in which police 
officers are pursuing their tasks). 
 77. Liggio, supra note 5, at 1219; Wald, supra note 55, at 424–39. 
 78. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 48, at 458. 
 79. See generally Ribstein, supra note 1. 
 80. NELSON, supra note 68, at 231–69. 
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1776 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
D.  The Fourth Generation of In-House Counsel’s Symbiotic Relationship 
with Big Law, 2000s–Present 
By the early 2000s, in-house counsel completed their comeback, taking 
the majority of the general counsel positions at large corporations from Big 
Law.  Along the way, the comeback transformed and, more accurately, 
restored the status and prestige of in-house counsel as members of the 
corporate legal elite.  Since the 2000s, the world of in-house counsel has 
experienced two trends:  (1) the continued growth, maturation, 
institutionalization, and professionalization of elite in-house positions and 
(2) the expansion of in-house positions outside of large entity clients. 
First, in the large, elite corporate sphere, in-house departments grew in 
size, streamlined and expanded the role of the general counsel, created new 
tracks for other in-house lawyers, institutionalized, and professionalized.  
The size of in-house legal departments increased significantly since the 
1980s, “making internal counsel one of the fastest-growing segments of the 
U.S. legal profession.”86  For example, one leading study “revealed that . . . 
in 2006–2007 . . . the median legal department employed 35 lawyers, the 
range in size was quite significant, with some companies having almost 
completely outsourced their legal function and others maintaining legal 
departments of more than 1,000 lawyers.”87 
As in-house departments grew, they streamlined the role of the general 
counsel.  Today’s elite general counsel, following the maturation, 
professionalization, and institutionalization of their roles between the mid-
1970s and the mid-2000s, simultaneously occupy the roles of cops, counsel, 
and entrepreneurs.88  Elite general counsel are advisors to senior 
management and, often, the board of directors.  Advising about situations or 
transactions, some general counsel act as cops, others as counsel, and yet 
others as entrepreneurs.  Yet acting as futurists purporting to discern and 
advise about likely trends of law and business and advising regarding 
strategic and informal planning inherently cuts across the cop-counsel-
entrepreneur divide.  One cannot act as a futurist or a strategic planner by 
only wearing the narrow legal hat of a cop.  For example, in advising senior 
management about “forward-looking systematic programs,” one must rely 
on and take advantage of nonlegal “traditional management techniques.”89  
The job description transcends being a cop and forces elite general counsel, 
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even those more comfortable reverting back to the role of a cop, to wear their 
counsel and entrepreneur hats. 
Next, elite general counsel select and retain outside counsel, supervise the 
work of outside counsel, oversee routine legal matters handled by the in-
house legal department, oversee and sometimes conduct routine and even 
major litigation, and quarterback special projects.90  Some of these tasks, like 
supervision of outside counsel and routine legal matters, are inherently legal 
and tend to gravitate toward the cop and counsel roles.  Yet, others, like the 
selection and retention of outside counsel, litigation, and special projects, 
organically move general counsel past legal knowledge and the role of a cop 
and toward the roles of counsel and entrepreneur. 
Elite general counsel also fulfill administrative and managerial roles.  As 
administrators, general counsels preside over both legal and nonlegal 
processes, which require them to marshal not only legal knowledge but also 
the business of law and related bodies of knowledge such as information 
management.91  As managers, general counsel contain costs and are expected 
to increase the productivity of the in-house legal department, impose controls 
on outside counsel such as budgets and risk analysis techniques—explicitly 
managerial and not legal procedures—stay abreast of and utilize new 
technologies, and acquire continued nonlegal education.  All of these require 
the institutional knowledge of counsel and the skills and judgment of an 
entrepreneur.  Some general counsel have even assumed responsibility for 
compliance.92 
In yet another sign of the maturation, professionalization, and 
institutionalization of the role of general counsel who are more secure in their 
elite status within and outside their entity clients, general counsel insist that 
they continue to wear the hat of a legal professional and assume 
responsibility for matters such as pro bono, interaction with the judiciary, and 
active involvement in bar associations, including both the Association of 
Corporate Counsel and other non–in-house specific organizations.93  The 
claim corroborates Nelson and Nielsen’s finding that elite general counsel 
meaningfully adhere to their professional identity as lawyers, even as their 
role requires them to master nonlegal bodies of knowledge and expertise.94  
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Moreover, even at a rhetorical level, the claim is symbolically significant as 
it reveals the professional aspirations of elite general counsel, living through 
the fourth-generation evolution of their roles.  No longer concerned with 
securing their position within the entity, these lawyers now seek to become, 
or at least portray themselves as, the “integrity” officers of their clients, 
charged with asking and answering not only “is it legal?” but also “is it 
right?” when no one else at the entity does.95  Importantly, elite general 
counsel aim to ask and answer both questions, not only in their capacity as 
cops but also in their roles as counselors and entrepreneurs or, as these 
lawyers prefer to term it, “accountable leaders.”96 
Thus, fourth-generation elite general counsel are not merely cops, counsel, 
and entrepreneurs.  They are also explicitly business leaders.  It is in this 
latter capacity as entrepreneur-leaders that these lawyers speak of their 
entities as pursuing a core mission of “the fusion of high performance with 
high integrity.”97  They also assert that their own role includes a new fourth 
component in addition to cop, counsel, and entrepreneur-leader—that of a 
high integrity officer, one that builds on and derives from their identities as 
lawyers and charges them with “resolving the partner-guardian tension.”98  
The significance of this development cannot be overstated as it allows elite 
general counsel to assert that they are the heirs to the dethroned Big Law 
powerful partners of the twentieth century and the contemporary standard-
bearers of the lawyer-statesman ideal.99 
This remarkable expansion and solidification of the general counsel’s role 
is reflected in its title change, from general counsel to chief legal officer 
(CLO).  Whereas, in the past, the titles were used interchangeably, recently 
their heightened public profile has helped to cement the general counsel’s 
standing as a member of the company’s senior leadership team.  Indeed, 
many top in-house lawyers have traded in the legal-sounding title of general 
counsel for the more corporate sobriquet of CLO to signal that they are part 
of the company’s C-suite.100  Moreover, at some corporate entities, the 
general counsel now reports to the CLO.101 
Outside of the role of general counsel, in-house departments have grown 
larger and more specialized.  The growth and institutionalization of in-house 
legal departments established new specialized tracks for lawyers interested 
in permanent employment with entity clients without necessarily the 
possibility of internal advancement, for example, as intellectual property or 
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labor and employment law associate general counsel subject-matter 
experts.102  It is not uncommon in some industries to observe a hierarchical 
structure in which several associate and assistant general counsel, in 
particular specialty areas such as intellectual property and labor and 
employment law, report to the general counsel, as well as the proliferation of 
more specialized in-house positions under such associate general counsel.103 
Growing in-house departments rely heavily on aggressive recruiting from 
the ranks of Big Law.104  This applies not only to senior partners but also to 
junior equity partners, income partners, and even senior and mid-level 
associates.  The successful recruitment of large law firm lawyers has been 
aided by a complicated mix of realities and myths about greater equality at 
in-house legal departments compared to Big Law.105  On the one hand, 
“women make up a significant percentage of the lawyers working in-house, 
including twenty-five percent of the GCs of Fortune 500 companies, 
according to a 2015 report from the Minority Corporate Counsel 
Association.”106  This is consistent with, and may be explained in part by, 
the harsh gender realities in Big Law, where women lawyers continue to be 
significantly underrepresented in positions of power and influence.  Indeed, 
“[t]his percentage is far higher than the average number of female partners 
in large U.S. law firms, let alone female managing partners or other senior 
leaders, who remain a tiny percentage of those who hold these positions.”107  
On the other hand, there is little evidence to support the advancement of 
women lawyers in corporate America, other than the position of general 
counsel, to other positions of power and influence within in-house legal 
departments, in C-suites, or on corporate boards. 
Second, outside the large elite corporate sphere, as the stereotype of in-
house lawyers as second-class citizens within the legal profession diminished 
and was gradually replaced with the perception of in-house positions as 
desirable and prestigious, in-house positions have begun to proliferate, with 
new entity clients hiring their first in-house lawyers and other entities 
expanding their in-house legal departments.  This growth was not merely 
driven by lawyers who were now willing, or even eager, to go in-house.  
Rather, as the benefits conferred upon entity clients by in-house lawyers, 
from early proactive compliance to reduced cost, became more visible and 
known, smaller entity clients began to create and staff new in-house 
positions.  To be clear, only entity clients of a certain threshold size and 
complexity of legal needs require in-house counsel.  Yet the in-house trend 
that arose in the 1970s and 1980s continues outside very large entities to take 
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hold in the large and mid-large entity client range.108  Notably, fourth-
generation in-house lawyers taking office in the expanding in-house world 
outside of the elite sphere of large entity clients face and struggle with 
challenges similar to those of third-generation in-house attorneys, namely 
establishing trust internally with clients and overcoming the perception of 
being a negative cost center.109 
These twin developments—the growth, professionalization, and 
institutionalization of in-house legal departments of large entity clients, 
complete with the evolution of the elite general counsel role, and the 
expansion of the in-house trend outside of large entity clients—have resulted 
in an increasingly diverse in-house world, as well as in the fragmentation and 
stratification of the in-house universe.110 
Whereas many nonelite general counsel and in-house lawyers are living 
through the third-generation in-house challenges of convincing corporate 
insiders that they are team players and trustworthy, elite general counsel have 
moved on to a more secure and mature stage.  As such, the latter, no longer 
engaged in the “establishing professional status project,” which they shared 
with all in-house lawyers and which benefited the entire in-house universe, 
are pursuing fourth-generation projects, which are at times at odds with the 
interests of nonelite in-house counsel.  Recall that third-generation general 
counsel were well suited to play the roles of cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs 
given their long-standing and secure relationships with their entity clients, 
which in turn allowed them to grow over time into the role of integrity 
officers.111  In contrast, fourth-generation general counsel who assume their 
position without the benefit of these background conditions may not be 
expected to act as integrity officers and, when the role expectations do exist, 
they may find them hard to fulfill. 
Thus, rather than featuring a neat universal world in which most in-house 
lawyers have moved past the third-generation return to power, vis-à-vis 
outside counsel and internal constituents within entity clients, to a fourth 
generation of professionalization, institutionalization, and consolidation of 
power, the complex diverse worlds of in-house lawyers consist of at least two 
increasingly stratified tiers:  (1) an elite general counsel fourth-generation 
sphere and, simultaneously, (2) a nonelite universe of general counsel and 
other in-house lawyers who are still fighting third-generation battles. 
 
 108. CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL 
REPORT:  THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005 (2012). 
 109. Wald, supra note 55, at 429. 
 110. On stratification in the legal profession between the individual and corporate 
hemispheres, see JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 (1982) (finding that the legal profession consists of two 
categories of lawyers whose practice settings, socioeconomic and ethnoreligious backgrounds, 
education, and clientele differ considerably); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS:  THE 
NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29–47 (2005) (documenting that lawyers work in two 
fairly distinct hemispheres—individual and corporate—and that mobility between these 
hemispheres is relatively limited). 
 111. See supra Part I.C. 
2020] CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS 1781 
Accordingly, rhetoric aside, it is important not to overstate in-house 
lawyers’ dominance and elite status in the twenty-first century.  The large 
universe of in-house lawyers, approximately 10 percent of all U.S. lawyers, 
or more than 100,000 attorneys,112 is anything but a homogenous monolith, 
and instead features rich diversity.  In-house lawyers span private and public 
practices, for example, as government lawyers.113  Some work in large-scale 
in-house legal departments, whereas many others are the sole entity 
lawyer.114  Next, whereas some in-house lawyers are generalists who oversee 
all legal matters on behalf of their entities, others are specialists with a narrow 
subject-matter expertise.115  Moreover, while some in-house lawyers work in 
centralized in-house departments reporting to a general counsel, others 
practice in decentralized settings and report to nonlawyer managers.116  
Finally, in-house lawyers vary by “locale, gender, position in organization, 
seniority in organization, nature of prior experience, and status of law school 
attended.”117 
Recognizing the great diversity within the in-house realm reveals an 
important insight:  not all in-house lawyers have experienced a growth in 
power, prestige, and influence.  Rather, this transformative change has been 
primarily the domain of a small, elite subset, the general counsel of large 
corporations.118  Early on, these elite general counsel used their power to 
advocate for elevated professional status for all in-house lawyers, in what 
Robert Eli Rosen described as the political mobilization of an “inside counsel 
movement.”119  Such efforts included the formation in the mid-1980s of the 
American Corporate Counsel Association,120 as well as notable rhetorical 
moves.  For example, Carl Liggio introduced the “employed” and “retained” 
lingo in lieu of “in-house” and “outside” to capture and reflect the new power 
dynamic in which employed in-house lawyers exercise power over and retain 
outside counsel.121  Thus, the rise to power of an elite subset of in-house 
lawyers—general counsel of large corporate entities—initially set off an 
ongoing campaign for elevated status for all in-house lawyers, only for the 
lawyers to experience stratification and friction in the fourth generation. 
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II.  IN-HOUSE AND BIG LAW:  CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE REALITIES 
The traditional understanding of the relationship between in-house and Big 
Law as a zero-sum game, in which the former won, should have resulted in 
at least three related consequences in the market for corporate legal services:  
(1) in-house counsel taking control of the core legal functions of the 
corporation from outside counsel; (2) the decline of Big Law; and (3) a large 
law firm exodus, a one-way street from Big Law to in-house legal 
departments.  None of these phenomena, however, have taken place.  Rather, 
in-house counsel have achieved only partial control over the provision of 
corporate legal services,122 and some large law firms have never been better, 
at least in terms of the profitability of their equity partners.123  The labor 
market has experienced the emergence of a two-way Big Law–in-house street 
and the rise of a robust in-house lateral market, all of which the revised 
symbiotic account helps explain. 
A.  In-House Partial Control of Corporate Practice and the Enigma of the 
Continued Success of Big Law 
To begin with, if in-house lawyers triumphed over Big Law in a zero-sum 
game, one would have expected at least two consequences:  (1) in-house 
lawyers gaining increased control over outside counsel and the core legal 
functions of the corporation and (2) a corresponding demise of Big Law.  
Neither outcome has transpired. 
As to the expected dominance of in-house counsel over Big Law, 
“[a]rguably the key feature of the in-house counsel movement in the United 
States has been the effort to wrest control over the core legal functions of the 
corporation away from outside counsel.”124  Yet, although in-house counsel 
have purportedly triumphed, “the success of this effort has been mixed.”125  
Specifically, 
[n]otwithstanding a significant investment in building up in-house 
capacities, many companies discovered that outside spending on law firms 
continued to escalate throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the 
21st century.  Similarly, the extensive monitoring and controlling of law 
firm [sic] did not result in increased levels of client satisfaction.126 
David Wilkins concluded that “[t]he result has been that GCs continue to 
have less control over outside counsel than the movement’s rhetoric might 
lead one to believe.”127  The author further explained that 
while there had been an important shift in the degree of control that internal 
counsel exercised over both the amount of work that is given to particular 
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firms, as well as the manner in which that work is assigned, evaluated, and 
compensated, it was an exaggeration to view GCs as employing a strict 
“spot contracting” model for the purchase of legal services.128 
What explains this “mixed” result?  Wilkins asserts a type of path 
dependency:  “In the words of one GC, terminating an important law firm 
relationship is a bit ‘like turning the Titanic’—something that takes an 
enormous amount of time and energy to accomplish and runs the risk of 
creating an even bigger disaster in the process.”129  The colorful metaphor, 
however, does not quite capture the path dependency argument accurately.  
Exercising control over Big Law by replacing a large law firm with another 
does not assume the risk of a disaster because arguably most large law firms 
can competently handle complex and costly corporate work.  Nonetheless, 
the cost of replacing outside counsel is likely to be high, including the 
external learning curve of the new law firm, the internal curve of corporate 
constituents dealing with new lawyers, and the cost of developing and 
adopting new templates.  Importantly, such a costly change is unlikely to 
result in significant savings as many large law firms follow a similar model 
for the provision of legal services.  Thus, path dependency provides in-house 
counsel with little incentive to change outside counsel.  Add to the mix the 
relatively short-term tenures of the modern CLOs and their busy schedules 
and exercising control over Big Law becomes even less of a priority. 
The symbiotic account offers additional explanations for the limited 
amount of control in-house counsel exercise over outside counsel and 
corporate legal services more generally.  First, as entity clients grew and their 
needs expanded to require inside representation (the “substantive” 
argument),130 the internal in-house growth was an incomplete substitute for 
outside legal needs.  That is, the legal needs of large global entity clients 
mean that there is a need for both inside and outside legal services that are 
not redundant.  In-house lawyers, who serve in preventive and proactive 
roles, can cover the routine tasks at a lower cost and also monitor outside 
counsel work.  Outside counsel, however, continue to provide specific 
specialized expertise, “people power” when needed for major transactions or 
litigation, and “bet the company” representations. 
In theory, in-house counsel could have rejected the Big Law model of 
outside legal services.  For example, instead of trying to replicate the Big 
Law model in-house or rely on it for outside legal services, general counsel 
could have assembled a team of subject-matter experts inside the legal 
department and relied on new, temporary, or alternative low-cost, nonelite 
providers of legal people power as needed.  Recall, however, that in-house 
lawyers were not seeking to replace Big Law as part of a professionalism 
project or a battle for status and standing.  This is not a matter of simplistic 
loyalty, a wink and a nod to their former Big Law colleagues at the expense 
of the entity client.  Rather, unlike replacing one large law firm with another, 
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which entails little risk but also offers little upside, replacing Big Law with a 
nonelite alternative does entail the risk of lower quality legal services, a risk 
that general counsel have little incentive to take.  Relatedly, bred and brought 
up in Big Law, in-house lawyers are familiar and comfortable with the large 
law firm model.  In-house counsel, simply put, have little reason to radically 
rock the boat of corporate legal services and the stable symbiotic relationship 
they have with Big Law. 
Second, the particular growth pattern of in-house legal departments in the 
late third and fourth generations explains the ongoing symbiotic 
codependency.  As in-house legal departments began to recruit mid-level 
lawyers from Big Law, including junior partners and senior and mid-level 
associates, these in-house lawyers often lacked the expertise of more 
seasoned Big Law partners and thus had to continue to rely on outside 
counsel for expertise. 
Third, as long as the majority of in-house lawyers were trained, mentored, 
and socialized in Big Law, their values and expectations were informed and 
framed by Big Law structure, organization, and realities.  Understanding 
themselves to be elite attorneys and Big Law lawyers to be their peers, in-
house lawyers were unlikely to retain nonelite legal services and indirectly 
undermine their own credentials and status.131 
At the same time, the extent of the symbiotic codependency between in-
house legal departments and Big Law ought not be exaggerated.  In 
particular, in-house lawyers have successfully curtailed the legal costs of 
outside counsel, not for necessary legal services but for the hefty premiums 
of large law firms, for example, by insisting on fee caps, managing the 
assignment of outside lawyers to their matters, and refusing demands for 
annual fee raises at significant bumps.  Similarly, in-house lawyers now 
perform many of the routine and other legal tasks previously undertaken by 
Big Law, cutting into large law firms’ profit margins.  In-house lawyers also 
gained some power by managing if not the content then the budgets, staffing, 
and resource allocation of Big Law. 
Large law firm partners, in turn, have lost power and influence to in-house 
legal departments and their general counsel.  Consequently, Big Law 
experienced greater instability and increased competition.132  Yet, the 
reasons for these practice realities are complex and are not all attributable to 
the rise of in-house counsel, and Big Law cannot be fairly described to be in 
a state of distress.  To begin with, seemingly paradoxically, some large law 
firms have never been better, judging by their profits per equity partner.133  
The traditional Big Law tournament of lawyers organizational structure 
depended on maintaining set ratios of partners to associates to generate 
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profits and growth, a model general counsel were able to disrupt, for 
example, by refusing to pay for the training of junior associates and by 
insisting on lean staffing of their matters.  Some large law firms responded 
by pursuing internal restructuring and the creation of new tracks within Big 
Law, which resulted in fewer equity partners sharing the spoils.134  Other 
large law firms resorted to the firing of some partners, the “de-equitization” 
of others, and to installing longer paths to partnership, all leading to increased 
stratification within Big Law.135  Importantly, however, this restructuring 
was not solely the result of in-house pressures on Big Law.  Rather, some of 
these measures were adopted in response to demands by rainmaking partners 
to abandon lockstep arrangements and to increase their compensation, all in 
the context of increased mobility and the implied threat that failure to yield 
may cause them to leave.  Yet other large law firms have recently 
experienced no growth or even reduced profitability.136  But these are coming 
after years of unprecedented growth, rising fees, and increased profits per 
partner, and in some cases are explained by either poor management or 
explicit choices to forgo growth and sustain less competitive cultural and 
institutional values.137 
Next, the number of large law firms grew tremendously over the last few 
decades such that the greater instability is explained in part not by loss of 
revenue to in-house legal departments (the size of the pie) but rather by 
internal competition (slicing the pie among a bigger group).138  Finally, while 
it seems like more large law firms have collapsed in recent years, the reasons 
have to do as much with the organizational and ownership structure of Big 
Law as they do with the loss of business to in-house legal departments.139 
In sum, the symbiotic codependency between in-house and outside counsel 
explains why the former have expanded their roles, prestige, and power at 
the expense of Big Law lawyers and yet have sought and obtained only partial 
control over the latter and the provision of corporate legal services.  The 
revised account also explains why the relative decline of large law firms’ 
profitability has not led, and is not likely to lead, to the demise of Big Law.  
The days of unchecked and annually rising fees are over, courtesy of in-house 
counsel.  Yet, Big Law can reasonably expect the continued flow of steady 
expert work from large entity clients.  Big Law volatility, instability, and 
increased competition are likely to continue for the foreseeable future as the 
“new normal” in the market for corporate legal services not exclusively 
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because of in-house lawyers but because of the high number of large law 
firms competing in the marketplace and the dominance of the “eat what you 
kill” culture in Big Law, as well as the outdated business models, 
organization and structure of many large firms, and the vulnerability of some 
to increased mobility and the lateral departure of their top rainmakers.140 
B.  In and Out of the House:  The Emergence of Two-Way Street Career 
Tracks 
Had in-house counsel triumphed over Big Law in a zero-sum game, one 
would have expected to see, over time, a one-way exodus from large law 
firms to in-house legal departments, akin to third-generation practice 
realities.  The fourth-generation era, however, has featured much more 
complex labor movements, consistent with the symbiotic account. 
Through the first and second generations of in-house practice, and through 
the first years of the third generation when Deborah DeMott first discussed 
in-house pathways,141 there was relatively little to say about the career 
trajectories of in-house lawyers.  As we have seen, during the first generation, 
general counsel, typically the only in-house lawyers working for the entity 
client, were state and federal judges.  These judges took in-house positions 
with the fast-growing railroads and investment banks, expected to stay in the 
positions for a while, and exited into groomed CEO positions or 
retirement.142  Second-generation in-house lawyers were employed by 
growing entity clients, which primarily utilized elite large law firms as their 
outside general counsel.  These lawyers were recruited from among the ranks 
of those who did not make partner in Big Law firms143 and planned to stay 
in-house permanently, in part because the low esteem of their positions was 
not conducive to a high-power move and in part because mobility per se was 
still unheard of.  Finally, the modern-era general counsel of the third 
generation had a fairly straightforward career trajectory:  having spent the 
bulk of their legal careers in Big Law and assumed the position of general 
counsel late, many expected to stay and retire after serving the entity.  This 
simple world of in-house career trajectories is all but gone, replaced with a 
vibrant maze of exciting new opportunities, career paths, and options. 
Early third-generation in-house lawyers in the 1970s and early 1980s were 
typically lateral hires from Big Law and thus were experienced, older, 
Caucasian men.144  As a reflection of the then relatively stable and long-term 
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relationships between large law firms and their entity clients,145 an early in-
house hire was usually a partner who had long represented the entity client, 
was familiar with it and its legal needs, and had gained its trust.  The lateral 
move was often welcomed by Big Law as it tended to cement the relationship 
with the entity client, which was expected to continue to utilize the services 
of its outside counsel when a former partner was installed as its general 
counsel.146 
As DeMott astutely explains, the first Big Law movers into in-house 
positions were likely motivated by a combination of factors.147  First, the 
long-term, stable relationship with the client implied relative stability in the 
new position, which was increasingly appealing given increased competitive 
practice realities at large law firms and their emerging “eat what you kill” 
culture (DeMott’s “law firm contrast” thesis).148  Second, to attract partners 
holding prestigious positions in Big Law to resign what were then de facto 
tenured positions, entity clients offered their new general counsel compelling 
compensation packages (the “economic” thesis).149  Third, given the stature 
and experience of the new hires, as well as their stable relationships with the 
client, the position was a good fit in terms of the talent, skills, and 
expectations of the new general counsel (the “fit” thesis).150  Finally, the new 
general counsel, by virtue of their seniority and career horizon, did not have 
an expectation of ever returning to their law firms.  Although the positions 
were new, and thus entailed considerable uncertainty, a move in-house was 
a one-way street.  The move was either a launching pad into other senior 
positions within the senior management of the client (the “launching pad” 
thesis) or into retirement.151 
As elite in-house legal departments gradually grew, associate general 
counsel and more junior positions were filled from the ranks of Big Law.  
General counsel, themselves products of Big Law, were familiar with large 
law firms’ personnel and valued the firms’ training and mentoring, which in-
house departments were not in a position to offer due to their relatively small 
size and orientation.152  Over time, such lateral hiring was facilitated by the 
increased competitive realities of Big Law, as some junior partners and senior 
associates, eager to escape oppressive billable hours, pressure to develop a 
book of business, and glass ceilings, flocked in-house.153 
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DeMott’s mobility framework suggests that late third-generation movers 
from Big Law to in-house departments were likely driven more by “law firm 
contrast” and “fit” considerations than by “economic” and “launching pad” 
reasons.  Unlike early movers, who were often senior partners leaving Big 
Law to become general counsel, later movers were typically younger junior 
partners and senior associates, escaping the increasingly competitive practice 
realities of Big Law.  The escalating billable expectations, longer and 
multilayered partnership tracks, and more explicit book-of-business 
expectations that required nonbillable hours have led to longer total work 
hours, stress, and a reduced ability to strike a reasonable, let alone desirable, 
work-life balance.154  For some Big Law lawyers, these increasingly 
competitive realities were oppressive and the “law firm contrast” thesis was 
a significant draw.  Even if ample information was not readily available, they 
hoped that in-house practice would prove more relaxed.155  Relatedly, some 
Big Law movers hoped to find a better fit in-house compared with Big Law, 
both in terms of job expectations and work-life balance.156 
In contrast, “economic” and “launching pad” reasons were likely less 
relevant.  Some in-house positions offered handsome compensation but 
information about economic incentives was lacking, often leaving 
individuals to negotiate based on incomplete information.157  Similarly, late 
third-generation in-house lawyers often could not effectively plot career 
trajectories out of in-house positions because information was scarce.158  Yet 
this was not necessarily a significant disadvantage.  For those looking to 
leave Big Law, a move in-house offered if not a clear career pathway then at 
least a new position and time to figure out their future either as a permanent 
in-house attorney or at another position down the road. 
Notably, while these late third-generation moves in-house were still 
grounded in an ongoing relationship with the entity client—typically an in-
house department will recruit a junior partner or a mid-level to senior 
associate who had worked on its matters while in Big Law—the hiring was 
somewhat haphazard.  Even as they were beginning to micromanage Big Law 
staffing in terms of who worked on their matters and how many billable hours 
they were allowed to charge,159 in-house legal departments did not select the 
Big Law lawyers initially assigned to work on their matters by the large law 
firms.  Thus, in-house departments ended up laterally recruiting whomever 
the large law firms assigned to work on their matters.  Similarly, Big Law 
lawyers moving in-house knew relatively little about in-house practice.  
These lawyers’ knowledge was limited to what they learned about the in-
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house departments and their attorneys while representing them as outside 
counsel in part because law schools offered virtually no relevant 
coursework.160  The lawyers had no influence over their assignments in Big 
Law, which in turn opened the door to and led them in-house.161  From the 
perspective of the Big Law attorney, the relationship with a would-be entity 
client employer was near completely random:  one would join a large law 
firm, would be assigned (or not) to work with a firm partner for a large entity 
client, and a few years later might develop a relationship with that client and 
receive a lateral offer.162 
Moreover, in this sense, a move in-house was not only random but also 
motivated by negative reasoning and realities in Big Law and incomplete 
information about in-house practice realities and career trajectories.  Large 
law firms’ junior partners and associates moved in-house not because they 
knew and desired the positions but by default to escape practice realities at 
large law firms and business development pressures and to seek shorter hours 
and enhanced equality.163  The maturation of in-house positions at large 
entity clients and the expansion of in-house practice outside large entity 
clients, however, have altered the nature and number of available career 
tracks for in-house lawyers. 
1.  Two-Way Streets:  Big Law and In-House Lateral Moves 
The evolving relationship between in-house legal departments and outside 
counsel has become a two-way street,164 with in-house lawyers returning to 
Big Law for several reasons.  First, the growth of in-house departments and 
positions and the expanding ranks and identities of in-house lawyers created, 
over time, a pool of possible Big Law recruits.  Rather than employing a 
single senior, older general counsel, in-house legal departments increasingly 
feature a diverse pool of lawyers, some of whom are in their thirties and 
forties as opposed to near retirement age.  These younger in-house lawyers 
are attractive to large law firms, which are seeking to better understand in-
house decision-making and benefit from the connections of former in-house 
lawyers in corporate America.  Yet, why would some in-house lawyers 
choose to go back to, and others move to, Big Law? 
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Consider the “law firm contrast” rationale.  Recall that some third-
generation Big Law lawyers left large law firms to escape their “eat what you 
kill” culture, the billable hour oppression, and the need to develop a book of 
business, whereas others left seeking more equitable work environments.  
The in-house and related corporate work realities and culture, however, are 
more complex and sometimes less of a Big Law contrast than imagined by 
lawyers.  Some of these in-house lawyers were disappointed and even 
disillusioned by in-house practice realities, which, although free of the 
billable hour and book-of-business concerns, featured their own demanding 
challenges such as soft hours, travel, and a foreign business culture often 
viewing lawyers as outsiders and naysayers.165 
While elite general counsel had mostly established themselves as respected 
and trusted C-suite advisors and executives by the 2000s, other in-house 
lawyers were still fighting third-generation battles to establish trust and 
overcome the perception of being part of a negative cost center.  For some, 
the business culture, in which lawyers were sometimes held in low esteem, 
was hard to adjust to166 compared to that of large law firms, in which Big 
Law lawyers were considered top dogs—both internally vis-à-vis support 
staff and nonlawyers and externally vis-à-vis other members of the legal 
profession.167  In sum, because information was not readily available about 
in-house practice, lawyers moved in-house only to discover that the law firm 
contrast was more complex and less of an obvious reason to leave Big 
Law.168 
Similarly, while in-house departments feature some greater equality—for 
example, 25 percent of all general counsel of Fortune 500 entity clients are 
women, a higher percentage than for equity partners in Big Law169—in-
house departments and their corporate hosts feature their own equality 
concerns and challenges.  As it turns out, while corporate America quickly 
promoted women lawyers to top positions as general counsel, it was less 
willing and able to change its male-dominated culture in some historically 
male-dominated industries such as manufacturing.170 
Next, the “economic” thesis has proved to be more complex as well.  While 
in-house legal departments offer competitive packages to lure Big Law 
lawyers and spare movers the need to worry about the billable hour and books 
of business, they include their own challenges.  Most notably, in-house legal 
departments have no expectations of quasi-tenure in the form of promotion 
to partnership.  Quite the contrary, like many corporate actors, in-house 
lawyers are at-will employees and can, and do, get fired when entity clients 
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downsize.171  To be sure, large law firms also let associates, and even 
partners, go, but the likelihood of being fired is higher and, indeed, part of 
the norm at corporate entities.  Related risk factors include unpredictable 
business conditions and the volatility of stocks and stock options. 
Moreover, the proliferation of career tracks in Big Law has created new 
ways to mitigate the downside of book-of-business expectations—for 
example, lawyers can become income partners as opposed to equity partners.  
This, to be clear, is not to dismiss concerns about who gets on what track at 
large law firms.172  But the point remains that if part of the “contrast” and 
“economic” motivations to move from a large law firm to an in-house legal 
department had to do with not having a big book of business and the fear of 
not making “partner,” Big Law now offers career opportunities that do not 
require rainmaking skills or “up or out” promotion to equity partner. 
As the Big Law world became more competitive, and placed an emphasis 
on books of business, for a transitionary period, large law firms were eager 
to have their former lawyers return as partners, which made the “economic” 
thesis a compelling reason to go back to Big Law.  Big Law assumed and 
hoped these in-house lawyers would come back with ample business from 
the in-house legal department they just left behind and relationships they 
formed in the business world while working in-house.  As it turned out, this 
wishful thinking did not always play out as planned.  While some in-house 
lawyers met these rosy expectations, others did not.  The proliferation of in-
house positions and ranks meant that returnees often had specialized roles—
for example, as associate general counsel for intellectual property or for labor 
and employment law—and therefore did not influence the flow of work from 
their former entity clients.  Moreover, having spent time away from Big Law, 
they sometimes found its culture hard to readjust to.  Thus, after a quick 
sobering period, Big Law became more discerning and brought back former 
lawyers for probationary of-counsel positions, pending a proven track record 
of a book of business, or as-needed to fill specialty needs created by client 
demands and lateral moves by partners and experienced associates. 
Consequently, fourth-generation in-house practice features a robust two-
way street, including not only “Big Law X to in-house to Big Law X” tracks 
but also “Big Law X to in-house to Big Law Y” moves.173  The evolution of 
this career trajectory, from a one-way to a two-way street, continues to 
legitimize and sustain the elite status of in-house practice at the same time as 
it enhances the standing of Big Law positions. 
2.  In-House Lateral Moves 
An emerging in-house lateral market, including both “elite in-house A to 
elite in-house B” and “elite in-house A to nonelite general counsel or even 
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nonelite in-house” moves, reflects both supply and demand forces.  On the 
supply side, the growth of in-house positions and their elite status, combined 
with the extended tracks in Big Law and the decreased probability of making 
equity partner, created a pool of increasingly well-informed lawyers who, 
after relatively short stints in Big Law, were ready to go in-house and then 
enter the in-house lateral market.  To be sure, some lawyers spend more time 
in Big Law and others move in-house seeking more permanent positions.  Yet 
Big Law and in-house practice realities have helped create a large and 
growing pool of lateral in-house lawyers, akin to the lateral market that 
emerged in Big Law beginning in the 1990s and maturing through the 
twenty-first century.174  This pool consists of lawyers who, after spending a 
few years in Big Law, take an in-house legal position with the expectation 
that, after several years at the entity client, they will laterally move to another 
in-house legal department at another employer. 
On the demand side, in-house departments have grown more experienced 
and sophisticated and need not, and do not, settle for haphazard lateral 
pickups from Big Law.  While large law firms continue to offer relatively 
well-trained and well-mentored lawyers (although that promise has been 
somewhat tarnished in recent years),175 some in-house departments seek 
lawyers with in-house experience for both general counsel and other in-house 
positions, often from other industries, for two reasons.  First, some in-house 
lawyers have signed noncompete provisions preventing them, as a condition 
precedent for receiving stock and stock options, from working for business 
competitors in the same industry.176  Second, the skill set of specialized in-
house lawyers, for example, as intellectual property or labor and employment 
law experts, is relatively transferable irrespective of the business industry of 
the entity client.177  Moreover, some in-house departments have started 
offering internships for both law students and recent graduates as well as 
limited entry-level positions.178 
The emergence of in-house lateral markets, back to Big Law and to other 
in-house positions, is not the first time the corporate sphere of the legal 
profession has experienced the development of a robust lateral market.  For 
nearly a century, Big Law operated under an implied but well-accepted 
gentlemanly agreement, in which large law firms promoted partners from 
within their own ranks and avoided lateral cherry-picking, making mobility 
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among Big Law firms a frowned upon, rare phenomenon.179  In the mid-
1970s, that attitude began to change.  In a string of decisions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court removed restrictions on advertisement, solicitation, 
competitiveness, and the flow of information in the marketplace for legal 
services.180  Trade journals began collecting, regularly publishing, and 
ranking associate salaries and profits per partner.181  The number of large law 
firms increased and the firms continued to grow, loosening old networks and 
social norms.182  Mobility became the name of the game, with associates, 
partners, and sometimes whole units shifting from one law firm to another.183 
While not necessarily increasing transparency about promotion criteria,184 
the emergence of lateral Big Law markets legitimated increased competitive 
conditions and a greater flow of information about large law firms’ practice 
realities.  It also normalized lateral movement, turning mobility into part and 
parcel of Big Law practice.  The development of a lateral in-house market 
suggests similar future trends in in-house practice.  That is, the emergence of 
two-way streets in and out of Big Law and of a robust lateral in-house market 
suggest that over time significantly more information will become available 
for in-house lawyers as they plot their careers and that accordingly mobility 
will become more common and more explicitly strategic, in turn making in-
house practice more competitive. 
3.  Moves from In-House to Business Positions 
Whereas first-generation and early third-generation general counsel were 
driven in part to leave judicial posts by the possibility of taking on senior 
management positions with an entity client, the Big Law equity partner to 
general counsel move has become less likely in the fourth-generation era.  
Entity clients now recruit experienced general counsel from a robust lateral 
market and have less of a reason to recruit a Big Law partner for the position.  
Moreover, Big Law partners in the twenty-first century are more likely to be 
subject-matter experts than long-standing generalists capable of becoming 
general counsel.  Yet, for Big Law lawyers looking to move in-house, 
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additional business tracks have evolved within entity clients outside of the 
C-suite.  Some in-house departments are centralized, with the general counsel 
or the CLO at the top of the internal chain of command.  Other entities feature 
a decentralized scheme, in which entity lawyers work outside of the in-house 
department and report directly to nonlawyers.185  While this structure 
exacerbates pressures to act as a team player because of the absence of a legal 
culture traditionally more encouraging of independent exercise of 
professional judgment,186 it also opens the door to new business 
opportunities and advancement within the entity—outside of senior 
management positions in the C-suite—as decentralized in-house lawyers 
become more intimately familiar with the working and business culture of 
the entity. 
Similarly, some in-house lawyers take business positions outside of the C-
suite, such as department heads and vice presidents, thinking of a move in-
house as the first step in transitioning to the business world, taking advantage 
of their legal training, and benefitting from the demise of the MBA degree 
and its credential power.187  As opposed to early third-generation movers, a 
typical in-house lawyer is younger, having spent only a few years at a large 
law firm.  As such, such a lawyer is less likely to be viewed inside the entity 
client as a naysayer or an outsider and thus more likely to be perceived as a 
committed team member,188 making a move into a business unit more 
plausible and seamless. 
4.  Nonelite General Counsel and In-House Positions 
Finally, as in-house positions expand outside large entity clients and the 
perception of in-house practice shifts from negative “did not make partner” 
to highly prestigious and coveted, large and mid-sized entities create new in-
house positions and may staff them with lawyers outside of Big Law and the 
growing in-house lateral market.  The significance of this development 
should not be understated because, even in the context of stratified in-house 
worlds, this trend blurs the traditional lines between the corporate and 
individual hemispheres.189 
In turn, the lateral in-house market and new career tracks help frame and 
shape the expectations and career trajectories of Big Law lawyers, in-house 
attorneys, and law students alike.  Those interested in in-house practice 
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should research a Big Law firm’s client base, if not in terms of specific clients 
then certainly in terms of industries and size of entity clients, before 
accepting a position, even as an associate.  At a firm, associates should pay 
attention not only to partners’ star power and rainmaking capabilities but also 
to client portfolios and target partners with a mix of clients and desirable 
portfolios.  For example, instead of relying on random work assignments for 
entity clients, interested associates should network early and often, both 
within and outside of the firm, with an eye toward being well positioned to 
learn about in-house opportunities.  This development, however, exacerbates 
concerns about Big Law transparency, the availability of cultural capital 
insights, and unequal flow of information in terms of who gets access to 
valuable information necessary for an informed, strategic career design190:  
whereas some unsophisticated associates would spend their time working 
hard to meet billable expectations, happy to have the job and assuming their 
careers will evolve naturally, other savvy associates would gather 
information, network, and pursue strategic in-house opportunities. 
At in-house legal departments, some lawyers will continue to seek out 
positions laterally as an alternative to Big Law, with an eye toward a 
relatively stable, permanent in-house position.  Others, given the emergence 
of a savvy lateral market, will pay attention not only to soft hours and firm-
specific investments but also acquire a skill set transferable outside the entity 
client, which feeds into and helps make in-house practice increasingly 
competitive. 
At law schools, for those seeking entry into Big Law, the recipe has long 
remained the same:  get into the best law school, earn the best possible GPA 
and class standing, and excel at extracurricular activities.191  If the student 
hopes to practice in-house, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of in-
house positions are still not available straight out of law school,192 there 
exists immersion in business law coursework (even for those interested in 
litigation, intellectual property, etc.) and the recent related corporate law 
programs certification phenomenon,193 possible interdisciplinary credentials 
(not necessarily MBAs but degrees in business-related fields),194 and 
extracurricular paths (such as in-house internships).195 
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C.  The Future of Corporate Legal Practice 
Prophecy, teaches the Talmud, is for fools,196 and yet the past and present 
of the in-house–Big Law relationship offer some clues as to the future of the 
fifth generation of in-house practice. 
First, as the lateral in-house labor market matures over time, a new 
generation of in-house lawyers will rise, one that has not been socialized in 
and beholden to Big Law and does not think of Big Law services as a familiar 
and obvious default.  Such in-house lawyers may be more open-minded and 
less risk averse about experimenting with new modes of outside legal 
services.  Sure enough, these new modes of outside legal services are upon 
us, including nonelite legal services, legal services provided by nonlawyers, 
and legal services increasingly utilizing artificial intelligence.197  Yet, “sea 
change” rhetoric notwithstanding, the current fourth generation of in-house 
counsel has proven generally reluctant to wholeheartedly embrace 
alternatives to the traditional Big Law model for outside legal services.198  
As we have seen, a self-sustaining, symbiotic codependency between in-
house and outside counsel, combined with the risk aversion and incentive 
structure faced by in-house lawyers, strongly suggests that, in the near future, 
large law firms have little to fear in terms of losing continued, stable demand 
for their core outside legal services.  In-house counsel have little reason to 
abandon or sever ties with large law firms.  Yet, as the paradigmatic fifth-
generation in-house counsel spends fewer years in Big Law, she is more 
likely to at least be open to experimenting with alternative forms of corporate 
legal services.  Thus, in the mid-to-long-term range, large law firms should 
expect even more competition in the market for corporate legal services.199 
Second, a generation less indoctrinated by Big Law and socialized in-
house may also be open-minded about trying out new models for in-house 
legal departments’ structure and organization.  For example, rather than 
mimicking the structure of large law firms or the current symbiotic model, 
some in-house departments may recruit and retain a high-level team of 
experts, a nimble high-end group that can then use a sea of paralegals and 
outsourced or temporary “on-demand” lawyers to assist in implementation 
of projects currently handled by Big Law.  Once again, such experimentation 
is likely to begin on a small scale and entail a lengthy trial-and-error-period.  
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But over time, in-house legal departments are likely to grow more diverse in 
terms of their organization and structure. 
Third, for a century now, critics have called on corporate lawyers to be 
mindful of the opportunity in the law and act as intermediaries between their 
entity clients’ interests and the public interest.200  In particular, some 
commentators, academics, and practitioners alike have called for and debated 
the desirability of corporate lawyers acting as gatekeepers.201  Irrespective of 
the normative persuasiveness of such claims, the next generation of in-house 
counsel is likely to find them less feasible and less appealing.  The ongoing 
integration of the in-house and outside counsels’ worlds via two-street tracks 
and increased mobility is likely to only intensify and empower market-based 
service ideologies of professionalism and undercut alternatives to them.  The 
“we are all consultants” state of mind and professional ethos202 is taking 
place while the integration of the worlds of in-house and outside counsel is 
weakening the professional, public-minded identity of lawyers, and in-house 
lawyers are moving closer to the service model of corporate executives. 
All of this does not mean the end of Big Law or the decline of in-house 
legal departments,203 but it likely means continued fierce competition in the 
market for corporate legal services and the need to remain as nimble as 
possible to compete with emerging new alternatives to the traditional model 
of corporate legal services. 
III.  PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED 
WORLDS OF IN-HOUSE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL 
The standard story of in-house practice and the relationship between in-
house counsel and Big Law lawyers is one of fierce competition, a zero-sum 
game in which the gains of in-house lawyers and, in particular, elite general 
counsel have come at the expense of Big Law partners.204  However, the 
practice realities and relationship of in-house and Big Law lawyers are far 
more complex and can more accurately be described as symbiotic—sharing 
the ethos of service and ideology of client-centered professionalism.205 
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In the past, the worlds of in-house and Big Law were separated.  First, 
during the second generation of in-house lawyers, they were hierarchical, 
with Big Law on top and in-house practice at the bottom.  Then, during the 
third- and fourth-generation eras, they were parallel, with equity partners and 
general counsel competing and vying for power.  Now, the worlds of outside 
counsel and in-house lawyers have begun to merge and are increasingly 
integrated, which is reflected in the shift from a one-way street from Big Law 
to in-house to a two-way street, the emergence of a robust lateral in-house 
market, and the recruitment of law students by in-house departments as 
interns.  Elite general counsel claim lawyer-statesperson status, a 
phenomenon only likely to gather steam as the flow of information about 
emerging in-house tracks grows.  Notably, the gradual convergence and 
integration of the in-house and Big Law worlds is taking place while the in-
house universe itself continues to expand and stratify. 
The growing integration of the elite in-house and Big Law worlds is not 
surprising.  Unlike the era in which large law firms deliberately built their 
elite status at the expense of the old, first-generation in-house lawyers,206 
third- and fourth-generation in-house counsel and Big Law lawyers were 
generally aligned in educational background, practice orientation, and 
professional ethos.  Both served large corporate entities, practiced in similar 
areas, adopted a business approach to professionalism, and understood their 
roles as a client-centered service.207 
This alignment ought not mask some tensions and friction points.  Big Law 
equity partners, for example, perceive some fourth-generation in-house 
lawyers as poorly trained because they left Big Law as mid-level associates 
and are now counsel who do not understand and cannot practice law at the 
highest level.208  In-house counsel, in turn, perceive some Big Law lawyers 
as insufficiently informed about the business world and the actual needs of 
entity clients and driven by billable hours and book-of-business expectations 
in the outdated “business” model of Big Law.209  Yet these quibbles 
notwithstanding, the core professional values and ethos of elite in-house and 
Big Law lawyers are increasingly similar, grounded in a client-centered, 
business-model conception of a service industry.210 
Notably, the growing integration of the worlds of in-house and Big Law 
may spread the dominant business ethos and model of professionalism even 
further.  Big Law socialization and practice realities set the stage for in-house 
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loyalty and service.211  But now in-house lawyers are bringing back the more 
explicit business ethic—“we are all consultants”—to Big Law and nonelite 
lawyers moving in-house may later bring the in-house ethos back to outside 
counsel practice.  This growing affinity between in-house and Big Law 
culture and habits is indicated by complaints about in-house lawyers and their 
understandings of their roles in ways similar to complaints about the roles of 
outside counsel.  Judge Stanley Sporkin’s famous, or perhaps infamous 
query—where were the lawyers?212—was originally directed at outside 
counsel.213  Yet recently, it has been invoked about in-house lawyers as 
well.214 
What are the normative implications of this integration?  On the one hand, 
the convergence of elite in-house and Big Law practice may be a positive 
development.  In-house lawyers were operating outside the mainstream of 
the legal profession, for example, not engaging in pro bono and having their 
own bar associations, continuing legal education events, etc.215  To the extent 
that Ben Heineman and others’ vision of elite in-house counsel commitment 
to engage with the bar is plausible,216 the growing affinity may be desirable.  
Furthermore, if in-house lawyers are embraced by the entire legal profession 
and increasingly think of themselves as lawyers, then they may be more 
likely to act as gatekeeper professionals in appropriate circumstances. 
On the other hand, the growing integration may obscure important 
differences between in-house lawyers and other lawyers, such as the 
difference between lawyer-employees and lawyer-professionals.217  
Historically, lawyers were (and are) professionals in at least two senses:  
commitment to the public good and independence grounded in formal 
education, esoteric knowledge, and elevated status.218  Employees, lawyer-
employees included, blur these professional features.  They are committed to 
their employers (usually a for-profit employer) and they lack independence, 
even if nonlawyers do not directly manage the manner in which in-house 
lawyers practice law.219  These trends, the erosion of commitment to the 
public good and decreased independence, are not unique to in-house lawyers, 
but in-house lawyers experience them more acutely.  These differences, in 
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turn, raise questions about the bar and its regulation in areas such as 
confidentiality, fees, and termination because rules of conduct meant to guide 
the conduct of lawyer professionals may ill-fit the practice of lawyer-
employees.220 
Notably, the issue is not only one of blurred roles and conceptual lines.  
The growing integration of corporate law practice, bringing in-house and 
outside corporate counsel closer together under a unified business-
professional ideological umbrella, may undercut the ability of all corporate 
lawyers to practice as gatekeepers and fulfill expectations and roles long 
advocated for by critics and commentators alike.221 
Arguably, all lawyers, not just corporate lawyers, have experienced a loss 
of commitment to the public good and have veered too much in the direction 
of client-centered service,222 such that what we need are discussions about 
new brands of professionalism, in which lawyers, all lawyers, are 
gatekeepers, or at least more open-minded about conceptions of role other 
than the one shaped by client-centered service ideology.223  Similarly, 
arguably all lawyers have experienced an increased lack of independence, 
such that what we need is a new conception of independence suited to the 
twenty-first century practice realities.224  Or maybe we do not.  Perhaps 
corporate lawyers, and indeed all lawyers, are ready to abandon their role as 
public citizens with a special commitment to pursuing justice.225  Either way, 
perhaps the growing integration of the corporate sphere of legal services will 
serve as a catalyst for a long-overdue discussion about the role of lawyers as 
professionals with responsibilities to clients, the legal system, and the public 
interest. 
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